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I. Introduction
The year 2002 saw important activity in the international trade policy field. Negotiations
for the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha Agenda began in earnest, as did various
bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements between the United States and other coun-
tries. Dispute settlement at the WVTO was the source of various significant developments,
highlighted by several cases brought and decided against the United States, the accompa-
nying and recurring complaints from U.S. executive and legislative branch officials that the
WTO is overstepping its authority in the settlement of these disputes, and the observation
by many that implementation of dispute settlement rulings is too slow.
On the domestic front, U.S. trade remedy laws remain among the most frequently used
across the globe. The United States applied safeguard (Section 201) measures against a vast
array of steel products that met with threats of retaliation, copycat cases, and WATO dispute
settlement complaints from non-NAFTA and non-developing countries. Meanwhile, the
antidumping and countervailing duties on softwood lumber from Canada placed strains on
the U.S.-Canada trade relationship.
Legislative activity in the trade field received a lift, as Congress finally provided the
President with trade promotion (fast-track) authority along with adjustments to the Trade
Adjustment Assistance program and a renewal of the GSP program. Congress also passed
the Homeland Security Act, which moved the Customs Service away from the U.S. Treasury
for the first time in U.S. history. Although several other pieces of trade or trade-related
legislation were not passed, they appear ready for action in 2003.
II. Negotiating Developments
In early 2002, countries around the world continued bilateral and regional trade talks.
Many of the negotiations in which the United States played a role were hampered or at
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least delayed by the absence of Presidential fast-track authority. Congressional passage and
Presidential signature of the Trade Act of 2002 in early August' freed the United States
Trade Representative (USTR) to wrap up ongoing trade negotiations and begin work on a
flurry of new negotiations, including initiation of bilateral and regional negotiations with
Morocco, Australia, and the nations of Southern Africa. Intense negotiation at the year's
end produced completed trade pacts with Chile and Singapore. On the multilateral front,
the Doha Round trade talks emerged from their first full year of negotiations with wide
differences among WTO members on negotiating modalities and other overarching issues.
The year ended on a negative note as talks aimed at reaching an intellectual property
agreement to ensure adequate supply of AIDS drugs and other medicines to developing
countries failed in late December. The United States' regional efforts in the Western Hemi-
sphere also proceeded with urgency in 2002 as the USTR focused on launching negotiations
with five Central American nations and reinvigorating talks regarding the Free Trade Area
of the Americas.
A. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENTS
1. Doba Round Negotiations
Doha Round negotiations began in earnest in 2002. Negotiating work at this stage was
primarily focused on negotiating modalities and other over-arching and horizontal issues.
In many important negotiating areas, such as agriculture, market access for industrial goods,
and services, initial proposals revealed wide differences among members that will be difficult
to resolve before the Cancun ministerial in September 2003.
Agriculture: Doha Round Agriculture negotiations in 2002 focused on modalities for
market access, export subsidies, and domestic support negotiations. At year's end, there
were still substantial differences among members' negotiating positions. With respect
to market access, the United States has proposed a so-called "Swiss Formula" negoti-
ating modality focused on eliminating peak tariffs, capping tariffs at 25 percent, and
proposing applied tariffs rather than bound rates as a starting point for negotiations.2
The Cairns Group3 has issued a proposal that also endorses a Swiss Formula approach
but rejects the U.S. focus on applied rates as detrimental to countries that have lowered
tariffs unilaterally.
The European Union, in contrast, favors a "Uruguay Round" approach to tariff cuts
that would cut all tariffs by 36 percent.4 The EU proposal also includes provisions
sought by developing countries, such as immediate duty-free access to developed coun-
try markets for least developed countries and differential treatment for developing
countries.'
1. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (Aug. 6, 2002) (Signed by President Bush August
6, 2002).
2. World Trade Organization, Agricultural Negotiations: The Issues, and Wbere We Are Now (Oct. 21, 2002),
available at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Agricultural Negotiations].
3. Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Indonesia, Ma-
laysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Uruguay. Canada did not join the
September 27, 2002 proposal.
4. European Union, Trade in Agriculture, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/goods/agri/
index-en.htm (last visited May 20, 2003).
5. Id.
VOL. 37, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 401
Similar differences emerged in discussions on export subsidies and domestic support
programs. The United States and the Cairns Group offered proposals calling for re-
duction of trade distorting domestic support programs to a de minimis level, while Japan
and Switzerland called for more flexibility on domestic support programs and the ability
to use tariffs and support programs to ensure food security. Even the United States and
the Cairns Group were far from agreement, however, with Cairns favoring elimination
of support programs on a disaggregated basis, while the United States proposes an
aggregated reduction strategy that allows a country to continue high levels of support
for particular goods if greater reductions are taken on other goods.
By year-end there were still wide differences in negotiating positions on agriculture.6
In addition to the above, environmental issues, food safety, and other non-trade con-
cerns continue to be sticking points.' In an overview paper presented on December 18,
2002, the chairman of the Agricultural Committee summarized negotiations and rec-
ommended that countries return to the table with increased flexibility and "think cre-
atively about avenues for convergence."'
Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products: As with agriculture, the biggest issue in
market access negotiations was modalities for negotiating tariff reductions. At the out-
set, negotiators could not even agree on a deadline for an agreement on modalities.
Finally, to bring about agreement on a timetable close to that anticipated for the ag-
ricultural modalities, the negotiators agreed to reach a common understanding on an
outline for an agreement by March 31, 2003. A final agreement on modalities is slated
for May 31, 2003.
Again, the United States is proposing a Swiss Formula reduction scheme with two
stages of tariff cuts. The first stage envisions by 2010: (1) elimination of all tariffs
currently below 5 percent and (2) application of a Swiss Formula with coefficient of
eight to all other tariffs2 The second stage would include a linear reduction of all tariffs
on consumer and industrial goods to zero by 2015.10 European Union and Japanese
officials reacted negatively to the proposal, calling it unrealistic. Many developing coun-
tries had similar reactions and, in particular, criticized the proposal for ignoring the
Doha mandate to give special treatment to developing countries. Among other issues,
developing countries also complained that tariff revenue is an important source of
government funds in many developing countries.I
Services: Doha Round services negotiations were intended to reach the stage of specific
requests by mid-2002, however; many members had not submitted requests by year's
end. Like the agriculture and market access negotiations, services discussions in 2002
focused on broad issues of approach to negotiations and treatment of developing coun-
tries. Two "horizontal" issues emerged as sticking points in the negotiations. First, the
Committee on Trade in Services is to evaluate the impact of negotiations on developing
6. World Trade Organization, Committee on Agriculture Special Session (Dec. 18, 2002) (TB/AG/6), avail-
able at http://www.wto.org [hereinafter Harbinson Paper].
7. Id. at 3.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 2; Agricultural Negotiations, supra note 2.
10. Id. at 3.
II. See, e.g., WASH. TRADE DAILY, Dec. 19, 2002, at 5.
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country participation in services trade. Developing countries argue that services lib-
eralization has been one-sided and focused on liberalizing sectors in which liberalized
countries have a comparative advantage while not opening areas, such as movement of
natural persons, in which developing countries have an advantage.
How and whether to give credit for autonomous liberalization also emerged as an area
of contention. Developing countries have argued that credit for autonomous liberali-
zation should be allowed only for developing countries. China and other members,
which made extensive commitments in their accession agreements, have also argued
that they should not be required to make further commitments in the current round
of services negotiations. 2 The deadline for submission of initial offers is March 31,
2003. It appears that progress in the services negotiations may depend on progress in
other negotiations that are of more interest to developing country members, such as
agriculture.
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights: In a separate declaration, the Doha Ministerial
declared that the Agreement on Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
"can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO
members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to med-
icines for all."" The Doha Ministers specifically identified the difficulties faced by
developing countries with little or no pharmaceutical manufacturing capability in using
compulsory licensing under TRIPS. The Doha Ministers instructed the Council for
TRIPS to find a solution to that problem by the close of 2002.'4 Negotiators apparently
agreed to allow countries manufacturing drugs under the compulsory licensing provi-
sion to export to poorer countries without adequate manufacturing capacity when those
drugs were destined to deal with epidemics and public health emergencies. However,
reports from the WTO and USTR reveal that the talks broke down when the United
States refused to accept a broad definition of diseases that would qualify for the excep-
tion." Later, the United States unilaterally announced that it would not challenge any
WTO member that exports drugs produced under compulsory license for treatment
of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and "other infectious epidemics of comparable
gravity and scale."'16
In addition to the pharmaceutical access issue, the Doha Ministers also agreed to com-
plete work on implementation of the Additional Protection for Geographic Indications
12. See, e.g., Commonwealth Secretariat, Doha Development News, Issue No. 4, July 19, 2002, 1 19, available
at http://www.thecommonwealth.org/actvities/dohadev.html; Services: Little Visible Progress as Members Reflect
on Requests and Wrangle on Assessment, BRIDGES WEEKLY TRADE NEW DIGEST, Mar. 26, 2002, at 1, available at
http:/wiw.ictsd.org/weekly/O2-03-26/story2.htm; STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL SESSION OF
THE COUNCIL FOR TRADE IN SERVICES TO THE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS COMMITTEE (Mar. 22, 2002) (TN/S/l/S/
CSS/ 11).
13. World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Healt/
4 (Nov. 20, 2001) (WTr/MIN(O1)/Dec/2), available at http://www.wto.org.
14. Id.
15. See U.S. Blocks TRIPS/Public Health, WASH. TRADE DAILY, Dec. 23 2002, at 1; Press Release, World
Trade Organization, Supachai Disappointed Over Governments' Failure to Agree on Health and Development Issues
(Dec. 20, 2002); Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Announces Interim Plan to Help
Poor Countries Fight HIV/AIDS and other Health Crises in Absence of WTO Consensus (Dec. 20, 2002) [hereinafter
U.S. Interim Plan].
16. U.S. Interim Plan, supra note 15.
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for Wine and Spirits called for in TRIPS Article 23.4. The Ministers agreed to launch
negotiations for the creation of a multilateral system of notification and registration of
geographical indications for wines and spirits by the Cancun Ministerial in September
2003.11 Negotiations on the registry have moved slowly. The United States is seeking
a registry that would serve as a database of geographic names that countries would be
expected to consult when making their own determinations as to which geographic
names should be reserved for products actually originating in a particular geographic
region. The European Union in contrast argues for a presumption that other WTO
members would protect geographic names listed in the registry. In a related matter,
some European nations are pushing for geographic indication protection for other
products, such as cheese, and have linked flexibility in agricultural talks to the outcome
of talks on geographic indicator protection.18
WTO Rules: The Doha Ministerial Declaration called for negotiations to clarify and
improve the disciplines of the AD Agreement and the SCM Agreement. 9 In the Trade
Act of 2002, the U.S. Congress made clear its view that U.S. trade remedy laws should
not be weakened or changed in future trade negotiations.2 0 The United States has
maintained the position that current WTO rules on antidumping and countervailing
duties need not be changed and tabled a concept paper in mid-October addressing the
value of remedial measures in promoting trade liberalization."
Dispute Settlement Understanding: While the rest of the Doha negotiations were to be
part of a single undertaking, completed and approved as one package by the VeTO
members, negotiations to improve and clarify the Dispute Settlement Understanding
were to be completed as stand alone negotiations by a proposed May 2003 deadline.22
At the end of 2002, successful conclusion by that date appeared increasingly unlikely
as members disagreed on the only proposal offered so far. The United States and Chile
tabled a joint proposal in mid-December calling for procedural reform of the dispute
settlement process. The proposal focused on increasing WTO member control over
the dispute settlement process, calling for opportunities for review of Panel and Ap-
pellate Body decisions, eliminating unnecessary findings in reports, allowing partial
DSB adoption of reports, and creating opportunities to suspend the dispute settlement
process while parties work out a resolution to the dispute. The proposal met with
considerable opposition from other VVTO members.3 The European Union, Brazil,
South Korea, Norway, and Switzerland criticized the proposal as a return to the less
judicial system used prior to formation of the VTO. Malaysia, Australia, and Colom-
bia, however, expressed general support for the proposal.24 Developing countries gen-
17. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Conference, Doba Ministerial Declaration T 18 (Nov. 20, 2001)
[hereinafter Doba Ministerial Declaration].
18. EU Push for Wine, Spirit Protections Linked to Strides on Agriculture, INSinE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 1, 2002,
at 10.
19. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 17, T 28.
20. See 19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(14) (2003); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-624 at 156 (2002).
21. World Trade Organization, Negotiating group on Rules, Communication from the United States: Basic Concepts
and Principles of the Trade Remedy Rules (Oct. 22, 2002) (TN/RL/W/2 7), available at http://www.wto.org.
22. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 17, T 30.
23. US, Chile Table WTO DSB Reform Plan, WASO. TRADE DAILY, Dec. 16-17, 2002, at 3.
24. Id.
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erally oppose injecting greater transparency into the dispute settlement process. An EU
proposal to create a permanent roster of professional Panelists as a solution to the
increasing workload of disputes and delays associated with Panel selection was likewise
met with criticism from the United States.
Investment: In 2002, a growing division emerged between countries seeking a new
WTO investment agreement and those opposed to any new commitments on invest-
ment. Canada, Japan, Korea, and the European Union are the leading proponents of
new investment negotiations, while developing countries are reluctant to take on any
new obligations. At year's end few developments were apparent in the investment arena.
2. Accession to the WTO
a. LDC Accession Rules
WTO Members approved guidelines to streamline the accession process for least devel-
oped countries (LDC). The guidelines call on developed nations to refrain from seeking
excessive concessions or commitments that are incompatible with the development, finan-
cial, and trade needs of the LDCs. The guidelines also call for transition periods for new
LDC members, assistance from the Office of the Director General, WTO Secretariat sup-
port in information exchange and accession procedures, and the provision of technical
assistance by WTO members."
b. New Accessions
Chinese Taipei became a WTO member on January 1, 2002. On October 15, 2002 the
General Council approved the accession package for Macedonia, which is still awaiting
approval from its legislature.26 Armenia's accession package was approved on December 10,
2002, clearing the way for Armenia to become the 146th member of the WTO." No new
requests for accession were made in 2002.28
c. Ongoing Accession Negotiations
At year's end, Russia and Cambodia appeared poised to complete accession negotiations
in 2003. However, a number of important issues remained outstanding in Russia's WTO
accession negotiations. Among the biggest issues was agriculture, energy pricing, and Rus-
sian membership in the civil aviation agreement. '9 Energy pricing remains a critical sticking
point for U.S. and EU negotiators who insist that Russia's low energy prices subsidize steel,
aluminum, and fertilizer, thereby leading to dumping on the world market. 0 Russia's do-
mestic support programs and export subsidies for agriculture are being targeted for deep
cuts by U.S. and Cairns negotiators. Russian officials, however, suggested that such reduc-
tions would be difficult given Russian agriculture's dependence on government interven-
tion.3' The United States insisted that Russia must join the plurilateral Agreement on Trade
25. Press Release, World Trade Organization, 9'7O Agrees to New Procedures for DG Selection, New Budget
and New Measures to Assist Poor Countries with Accession (Dec. 12, 2003).
26. World Trade Organization, New requests and completed accessions, available at http://www.wto.org/english/
thewto e/acc-e/newrequest-e.htm (last updated Jan. 2003).
27. World Trade Organization, Current Status of Individual Accessions, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/acc e/status-e.htm (last updated Feb. 2003).
28. Id.
29. Moving Into Crucial Russia H/TO Talks, WAsH. TRADE DAILY, Dec. 16-17, 2002, at 5.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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in Civil Aircraft, which would require it to eliminate import duties on civilian aircraft.
Russia has resisted joining the agreement, citing the current difficulties experienced by its
civil aircraft industry." Negotiations are expected to continue through the first quarter of
2003 with the goal of completing an accession package by 2003 for presentation at the
Cancun ministerial in September."
The third meeting of the working party on Cambodia's accession took place on Novem-
ber 14, 2002. At that meeting Members began focusing on drafting the Working Party
Report and defining the terms of Cambodia's entry into the WITO.' 4 At this point, Cam-
bodia is working toward approval of its accession agreement at the Cancun ministerial,
along with Russia (although Russia and Cambodia were the only accessions on track for
Cancun approval). At the end of 2002, twenty-six nations were in the process of negotiating
accession agreements," with varying target dates for final accession.16
3. Steel Negotiations
Negotiators from major steel producing nations announced on December 19, 2002 that
they would begin talks aimed at reducing overcapacity and reducing or eliminating subsi-
dies. Many issues remain to be resolved, including a timetable for talks and whether the
negotiations would take place within the WTO or the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD). Negotiators indicated that talks might be completed
in time for presentation of an agreement at the September 2003 VVTO Ministerial in
Cancun.35 Although the talks are aimed at subsidies and global capacity reduction, nego-
tiators expect that other issues, such as trade remedy laws, may be broached. North Amer-
ican steel producers urged specific actions to address overcapacity and encouraged expan-
sion of the zero-for-zero tariff reduction initiative in the WTO.O
B. U.S. BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS
1. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement
After years of talks and tense last-minute negotiations on investment, agriculture, dispute
settlement, and intellectual property rights, the United States and Chile concluded nego-
tiation of a bilateral free trade agreement on December 11, 2002. " Hurdles included Chile's
insistence on maintaining its ability to use capital controls to protect itself from a sudden
exodus of capital. Another sticking point was the United States' demand for stronger pro-
tection of intellectual property rights, which Chilean negotiators feared might weaken the
32. Id.
33. Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation: Concluding remarks by tbe Chairman, Dec. 18, 2002,
available at http://,Aww.wto.org/english/news-e/news02-e/accession-russian-l 8dec02-e.htm.
34. World Trade Organization, Current Status of Individual Accessions, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewtoe/acc e/status_e.htm (last modified Feb. 2003).
35. World Trade Organization, List of Applicants to Become WTO Members, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto.e/acc-e/workingpart_e.htm.
36. World Trade Organizations, List ofApplicants to Become tITO Members, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto-e/acc.e/workingparte.hum (last modified Dec. 2002).
37. Steel Producers Agree to Negotiations, VASH. TRADE DAILY, Dec. 20, 2002, at 1.
38. Id.
39. Press Release, USTR, U.S. and Chile Conclude Historic Free Trade Agreement (Dec. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/2002/12/02 -114.htm.
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competitiveness of Chilean industry.4° Agricultural provisions and sanctions for derogation
of trade or environmental laws also proved contentious. 41
The final agreement will eliminate all tariffs and quotas, including those on agricultural
goods, over twelve years. 42 The services provisions cover major sectors and contain regu-
latory transparency provisions that have been praised by U.S. business groups. 43 Although
the entire agreement was not released by the end of the year, information provided by
USTR reveals several other groundbreaking provisions in the U.S.-Chile FTA. The con-
troversial issue of capital controls was resolved by a provision for restitution if such controls
are used.44 In a concession to Chile, however, the agreement requires a one-year waiting
period for complaints against controls on short-term capital flows and a six-month waiting
period for complaints against controls on long-term capital flows. 41 Another notable pro-
vision is a competition chapter that requires Chile to maintain laws prohibiting anti-
competitive business practices. Environmental provisions in the agreement provide for
stronger cooperation, including a program to develop alternatives to the controversial pes-
ticide methyl bromide. Also of note, the agreement will establish a new U.S. visa for up to
1,400 Chilean professionals per year who have a letter of support from a U.S. company.46
Chilean officials noted that the agreement maintained protection for Chile's cultural in-
dustry, including the ability to subsidize the arts, maintain domestic content quotas for
television programming, and require Chilean citizenship for top officials of Chilean media
companies. 47
2. U.S.-Singapore Agreement
As with the Chile FTA, the Singapore pact negotiations appeared to stall at the last
minute over Singapore's insistence on the right to impose restrictions on capital movements
in times of crisis. Although the countries' negotiators were still discussing the capital move-
ment issue at the end of 2002, completion of the agreement was announced on November
19, 2002.48 The agreement requires Singapore to reduce its tariffs immediately to zero and
contains broad market access provisions sought by the U.S. banking industry. Like Chile,
Singapore committed to enacting competition laws and ensuring that government enter-
prises will not engage in anti-competitive behavior.
3. Free Trade Area of the Americas
The negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), launched by thirty-four
nations in the Western Hemisphere in June 1995, hit some roadblocks in 2002. At the
Ministerial meeting in Quito in November, there remained open disagreement on the U.S.
proposal to negotiate differentiated access to the U.S. market depending on a country's
level of development.- Brazil has voiced opposition to a differentiated approach. The pre-
40. INSIDE-U.S. TRADE, Dec. 4, 2002, at 3.
41. Id.
42. USTR, Free Trade with Chile: Summary of the U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, available at http://





47. Steel Producers Agree to Negotiations, supra note 37, at 5.
48. US, Singapore Reach FTA-Almost, WAsH. TRADE DAILY, Nov. 20, 2002, at 1.
49. Trade Ministers Set to Endorse FTAA Schedule, Struggle with AID, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 1, 2002, at 5.
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carious political situation in Venezuela and the election of populist Luiz Inacio Lula da
Silva to the Brazilian presidency raised fears that the already drawn-out FTAA talks would
be further delayed. Following his election, Mr. Lula vowed to assert Brazil's role as a re-
gional leader and declared that relations within the Mercosur trading bloc would be his top
foreign relations priority.
4. New Negotiations
In 2002, the Bush administration announced its intention to begin FTA negotiations
with five Central American countries, Morocco, Australia, and the Southern African Cus-
toms Union. A number of other countries, including New Zealand,o Indonesia," and Peru 2
have requested FTAs with the United States.
* CentralAmerica. In early October, the USTR notified Congress of the Administration's
intent to enter trade negotiations with the five Central American countries of Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua." Panama and Belize are not
included in the talks. Actual negotiations are set to begin in January 2003.
* Morocco. The USTR notified Congress of the Administration's intent to negotiate a
free trade agreement with Morocco on October 1, 2002.14 USTR Robert Zoellick
asserted that the agreement would help that country "accelerate [its] embrace of the
modern world economy. T5
* Southern African Customs Union. On November 4, 2002, USTR notified Congress of
the Administration's intent to begin trade negotiations with the nations of the Southern
African Customs Union: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.
South African business groups have highlighted subsidies and trade barriers on agri-
culture, along with U.S. trade remedy laws as particular areas of concern. 6
- Australia. Initially, negotiations with Australia were delayed due to the importance of
agriculture in any deal with Australia. Nevertheless, the Administration announced
its intent to pursue an agreement with Australia on November 13, 2002 and issued
50. Chris Rugaber, New Zealand Prime Minister Presses Bush Administration on FTA, Farm Bill, Steel, INT'L
TRADE DAILY, Mar. 28, 2002.
51. See News Archives, American Council for Trade in Services (Nov. 22, 2002), available at http://www.acts-
talks.com/archives.htm. "USTR Robert Zoellick proposed negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with Indo-
nesia after he visited the site of the recent bomb blast in Bali. Mr. Zoellick said that improved security, hu-
manitarian help, and increased trade will be vital for the country's economy to recover." See also Joint Press
Conference, Indonesian Minister for Industry and Trade Rini Soewandi and U.S. Trade Representative Robert
B. Zoellick, Nov. 21, 2002, in Bali, Indonesia, available at http://www.usembassyjakarta.org/pressrelU
zoelick rini.html. "Minister Rini Soewandi: 'There was also a meeting recently in the Philippines between
ASEAN and USTR, wherein the U.S.-ASEAN Trade Investment Framework was discussed, which Indonesia
actually signed in 1997 with the U.S. Indonesia supports this initiative and even emphasizes the need to move
forward on this cooperation, probably conduct a study and seek funding, to explore the possibility of a free
trade agreement between Indonesia and the U.S."
52. See WASH. TRADE DMLY, Dec. 4, 2002 (quoting Peruvian President Alejandro Toledo as promising to
do "everything we can" to make a bilateral trade deal with the United States).
53. See Letter from USTR to Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 1, 2002),
available at http://www.ustr.org/releases/2002/10/2002-10-01 -centralamerica-house.pdf.
54. Id.
55. USTR, Free Trade with Morocco: Helping to Solidify Economic Reforms (2001), available at http://
www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleast/2003-01-21 -morocco-factsheet.pdf.
56. WASH. TRADE DAILY, Dec. 25-27, 2002.
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reassurances to farm groups that the FTA would improve access to the Australian
market." The deal is scheduled for completion in 18 months."8 Opposition leaders in
Australia's Senate pushed through a vote calling for a special inquiry into the impact
of the proposed trade agreement on Australia.5 9 Nevertheless, Australian officials ex-
pressed confidence that the negotiations would be completed on time.
60
5. Other U.S. Negotiations
In mid-December, the United States and Brunei signed a trade and investment frame-
work agreement. The agreement called for the creation of a Joint Council on Trade and
Investment to promote cooperation between the two countries on issues such as biotech-
nology, tourism, protection of investment, facilitation of trade, and information technolo-
gies.6 1 The agreement is seen as moving the United States closer to a trade pact with the
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). At the October Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit in Mexico, President Bush announced that the United States
would seek bilateral trade pacts with ASEAN member countries after completing trade and
investment framework agreements with those countries.62
I. WTO Dispute Settlement Activity
The total number of Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) complaints filed this year
rose to thirty-seven, 60 percent more than the number filed last year.63 The number of
complaints brought against the United States increased dramatically this year to nineteen,
up sharply from six complaints last year,64 though this is partly the result of multiple com-
plaints concerning a single measure (the steel safeguard measures). The concentration of
countries filing complaints was much more dispersed than in previous years. For example,
Brazil filed five, and Canada, the European Community (EC), and the United States each
filed four complaints. 65 The Safeguards Agreement was the subject of eleven complaints
(eight involving the U.S. steel safeguard measures), while the Antidumping Agreement (AD
Agreement), the Subsidies and Countervailing Duty Agreement (SCM Agreement), and the
Agriculture Agreement were each the subject of seven complaints. 66
One of the most interesting developments in the VVTO dispute settlement arena during
the course of 2002 was the heightened level of criticism of Panel and Appellate Body
57. See Letter from USTR to Dennis Hastert, supra note 53; USTR Reassures Farm Groups as it launches
Australian FTA, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 15, 2002, at 1.
58. Peter Hartcher, U.S. fast-tracks free trade deal for Australia, FIN. REV., Nov. 13, 2002.
59. Steel Producers Agree to Negotiations, supra note 37, at 4.
60. Id. at 7.
61. Trade and Investment Framework, Dec. 16, 2002, U.S.-Brunei Darussalam, available at http://
www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/2002 -12-16-brunei-tifa.pdf
62. U.S. Seeks FTAs With Asean Countries in Bid to Encourage Reform, INSIDE-U.S. TRADE, Nov. 1, 2002,
at 7.
63. World Trade Law, Number of T(.) Complaints/Matters under the DSU, at http://www.wordtradelaw.net/
dsc/stats.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
64. World Trade Law, W/TO Complaints Filed Against Specific WTO Members as Respondents, at http://
www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/stats.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
65. World Trade Law, WTO Complaints Filed By Selected WTO Members, at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
dsc/stats.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
66. World Trade Law, Number of Complaints Filed under Selected WITO Agreements, at http://
www.worldtradelaw.net/dsc/stats.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
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decision-making, specifically the U.S.-driven allegation that the DSB is adopting reports
that step beyond the appropriate standard of review and, in effect, creating law where the
Agreements were otherwise silent. The United States became particularly vocal about this
in the context of the U.S.-Line Pipe decision 6 and has continued to complain about the
issue in subsequent reports.68 Meanwhile, the United States has been slow to implement
various WTO rulings, particularly those requiring legislative action.
A. D[SPUTE SETTLEMENT REPORTS
1. Reports Addressing the Agreement on Safeguards
The only ruling issued this year involving the Agreement on Safeguards was the Appellate
Body's decision in United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures On Imports Of Circular
Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe From Korea.69 The Appellate Body agreed with some but
not all of the Panel's rulings. It first found that the United States did not give Korea
"sufficient time" to allow for a "meaningful exchange" in the consultations, thereby violat-
ing Article 12.3 of the Agreement. Additionally, the Appellate Body concluded that because
the United States' "expectations" regarding future import volumes were insufficient the
application of the measure to imports from developing countries violated Article 9.1 of the
Agreement, at least for countries whose shipments met the de minimis levels set forth in
that provision.
The Appellate Body also ruled on the issue of whether there is an obligation to make a
discrete determination either of serious injury or of threat of serious injury. The Appellate
Body concluded that the phrase "cause or threaten to cause" in Article 2.1 could mean either
"one or the other" or "both in combination." On this basis, the Appellate Body reversed the
Panel's decision, finding that a domestic authority may find that there is "serious injury,"
"threat of serious injury," or, as the ITC found here, "serious injury or threat of serious
injury."
The Appellate Body also disagreed with the Panel on the issue of "parallelism" and
therefore overruled the Panel's finding that Korea had not made a prima facie case of a
violation of this requirement. Specifically, the Appellate Body found that the United States
did not provide a reasoned and adequate explanation that established explicitly that imports
from non-NAFTA sources by themselves satisfied the conditions for the application of a
safeguard measure. Because the ITC had included Canada and Mexico in the analysis of
whether increased imports caused or threatened to cause serious injury, while excluding
Canada and Mexico from the application of the safeguard measure, the Appellate Body
found the United States in violation of Articles 2 and 4.0
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's decision regarding non-attribution, finding that
the ITC did not adequately explain how it ensured that injury caused to the domestic
67. U.S. Safeguard Violations, Steel Safeguard, Slammed at W7O Meeting, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 15, 2002,
available at http://www.inside.trade.com.
68. Executive Branch Strategy Regarding WTO Dispute Settlement Panels and the Appellate Body, Report to
Congress Transmitted by the Secretary of Commerce (Dec. 30, 2002), available at http://www.itadoc.gov (last
visited Mar. 6, 2003).
69. WTO Appellate Body, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures On Imports Of Circular Welded Carbon
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industry by factors other than increased imports was not attributed to increased imports,
in contravention of Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.7' This represented the
third safeguards case in which the Appellate Body rejected this aspect of the ITC's causation
analysis.72
Finally, the Appellate Body made two important rulings concerning Article 5.1 of the
Agreement. First, it clarified that Article 5.1 "must be read as requiring that safeguard
measures be applied only to the extent that they address serious injury attributed to in-
creased imports." Such measures may not remedy, in other words, the effects of other causes.
The Appellate Body went on to conclude, in a reversal of the Panel's ruling, that by estab-
lishing that the United States violated the non-attribution requirements of Article 4.2(b),
Korea made a prima facie case that the U.S. safeguard measure went beyond the extent
permissible under Article 5.1. That is, because the United States had not separated and
distinguished the effects of imports versus other causes, it could not ensure that it had
applied the line pipe safeguard measure "only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy
serious injury and to facilitate adjustment."
2. Reports Addressing the AD and SCM Agreements
Members' implementation of the AD and SCM Agreements continued to be the subject
of the majority of the WTO disputes. We review some of the more important reports
addressing these agreements below.
a. AD and CVD Trade Remedy Cases
(i) United States-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate From India.7"
India claimed in this case that the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) acted incon-
sistently with Article 6.8 and Annex II of the AD Agreement with its application of "facts
available." The United States argued that the information was either incomplete or was
never submitted in a usable format. The Panel found that the USDOC must explain the
problems with the "usability" of this data and was not entitled to reject all the data. There-
fore, the USDOC's application of facts available in this case was inconsistent with Article 6.8
and Annex II, paragraph 3 of the AD Agreement.
India had also argued that Sections 776(a), 782(d) and 782(e) of the Tariff Act of 1930
(Tariff Act) were inconsistent with the AD Agreement because those provisions require the
USDOC to apply facts available in a determination even when valid information was sub-
mitted. The Panel disagreed finding that those provisions are discretionary and that they
may be applied by USDOC in a manner consistent with Article 6.8. The Panel also con-
71. \VTO Panel, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures On Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality
Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/R (Oct. 29, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
72. See VeTO Appellate Body, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures On Imports of Wheat Gluten from
the European Communities, WT/DS166/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last
visited Mar. 6, 2003); WI 0 Appellate Body, United States-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Fresh, Chilled or
Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and Australia, WTI/DSl 77/AB/R and WT/DS/178/AB/R (adopted May
16, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2003). See also WTO Appellate Body, United
States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan, WVT/DS I84/AB/R (adopted
Aug. 23, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2003) (involving same provision in AD
Agreement).
73. WTO Panel, United States-Anti-Dumping And Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate From India, VT/
DS206/R (June 28, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
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cluded that India's effort to challenge the U.S. "practice" of applying facts available was
not a "measure" that could be challenged under the DSU. There was no request for an
appeal, and the Panel report was adopted.14
(ii) United States-Preliminary Determinations With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber
From Canada." The Panel in this case agreed with Canada that the USDOC erred in its
countervailing duty investigation when it compared Canadian stumpage prices with those
charged in the United States, rather than with prices observed in Canada (which is the only
in-country source for "prevailing market conditions"), thus violating Article 14(d) of the
SCM Agreement. Canada also claimed that the USDOC inappropriately assumed that the
stumpage rights constituted a financial benefit by the Canadian Government and that they
conferred a benefit on the downstream producers of softwood lumber. The Panel found
that stumpage rights indeed constituted a benefit but agreed with Canada that the USDOC
failed to examine the actual benefit conferred on the allegedly subsidized product, contrary
to SCM Agreement Article 1.1(b). The Panel also agreed with Canada's claim that the
United States' retroactive application of provisional measures in this case violated Article
20.6 of the SCM Agreement. The Panel stated that, although duties may be assessed ret-
roactively in accordance with Article 20.6, "the general rule of non-retroactivity applies to
provisional measures, without exception." The Panel also found that provisional measures
were applied too early and lasted for too long, in violation of Article 17.
(iii) United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat
Products from Germany.16  This dispute challenged for the first time U.S. sunset review
procedures. In the disputed case, because the USDOC and the ITC found both a likelihood
of future subsidization and injury, the United States did not revoke the CVD order on
carbon steel from Germany. The European Union challenged the USDOC's automatic
self-initiation of sunset reviews, claiming that such initiation must be accompanied by a
showing of sufficient evidence to justify the review, as required by Articles 10, 21.1 and
21.3 of the SCM Agreement. The Panel and the Appellate Body disagreed finding no such
explicit evidentiary requirement. However, in a reversal of the Panel, the Appellate Body
found that there is no explicit requirement to apply "any de minimis" standard in sunset
reviews.
Importantly, the United States did not appeal the Panel's finding that the USDOC's
likelihood determination in this case was insufficiently rigorous. Although U.S. law itself
was found to be consistent with the SCM Agreement, its application in this case was not.
The United States attempted to reverse this aspect of the panel's decision with a procedural
claim before the Appellate Body, but the procedural claim was rejected. The panel's decision
was therefore adopted.
(iv) United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products From The European
74. WTO Panel, United States-Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures on Steel Plate From India, WT/
DS206/7 Uune 28, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
75. WTO Panel, United States-Preliminary Determinations With Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber From
Canada, WT/DS236/R (Sept. 27, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
76. WTO Panel, United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Products
from Germany, WT/DS213/R (July 3, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002). See also
WTO Appellate Body, United States-Countervailing Duties on Certain Corrosion-Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Prod-
uctsfrom Germany, WT/DS213/AB/R (Nov. 28, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6
2002).
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Communities." In this dispute, the Appellate Body reversed the Panel's finding that
privatizations at arm's-length and for fair market value must lead to the conclusion that the
purchaser did not receive a benefit or advantage from a prior financial contribution be-
stowed upon the state-owned producer. The Appellate Body found that there is no "per se
rule requiring" the investigating authorities to determine that a "benefit," derived from
pre-privatization financial contributions, expires following privatization at arm's length and
for fair market value.78
The Appellate Body upheld the Panel's finding, however, that the USDOC imposed
countervailing duties without assessing the existence of countervailable subsidization after
a privatization or change in ownership. The Appellate Body also upheld the Panel's finding
that the "same person" methodology applied by USDOC is inconsistent with the SCM
Agreement "as it prohibits the examination of the conditions of the privatization-transaction
when the privatized producer is not a distinct legal person based on criteria relating mainly
to the industrial activities of the producers concerned."
(v) United States-Section 129(c)(1) of The Uruguay Round Agreements Act."' This case
addressed the provision of U.S. trade remedy law that limits the retroactive application of
determinations implementing adverse WTO dispute settlement decisions. Canada and the
United States agreed in this case on the general principle of prospective implementation
of DSB rulings but disagreed on whether the principle permits a Member to take WTO-
inconsistent actions after the date of implementation. Canada claimed that Section 129(c)(1)
of the URAA violates Articles VI:2, VI:3, and VI:6(a) of the GATIT 1994, Articles 1, 9.3,
11.1, and 18.1 of the AD agreement and Articles 10, 19.4, 21.1, and 32.1 of the SCM
Agreement. Canada argued that by applying V/TO rulings only to entries made "on and
after" USTR directs implementation, Section 129(c)(1) effectively requires WTO-
inconsistent actions with respect to "prior unliquidated entries." Canada argued that im-
ports that entered the United States prior to that date would remain subject to future
administrative review determinations and definitive duty assessment using V/TO-
inconsistent rules."s The Panel agreed with the United States that there is nothing estab-
lished in the AD Agreement, the SCM Agreement or GA-1T 1994 that provides any re-
quirements related to timing of implementation of adverse V/TO reports. Canada did not
appeal this decision and the Panel report was adopted.
b. Subsidy Cases
(i) Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees Regional Aircraft.' Brazil alleged in
this case that Canada continues to provide export subsidies through equity infusions by its
Export Development Corporation (EDC). This case is closely tied to a previous dispute
Canada-Aircraft I, where the Panel found that Canada was providing illegal export subsidies
77. WTO Appellate Body, United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products From The Eu-
ropean Communities, WT/DS212/AB/R (Dec. 9, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6,
2002).
78. Id. 121.
79. WTO Panel, United States-Section 129(c)(1) of The Uruguay Round Agreements Act, WT/DS22 /R (July
15, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
80. Canada claims that the following specific provisions were violated: Article VI:2, VI:3, and VI:6(a) of the
GAT 1994; Articles 1, 9.3, 11.1, and 18.1 of the AD Agreement and Articles 10, 19.4, 21.1, and 32.1 of the
SCM Agreement. Id.
81. WTO Panel, Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees Regional Aircraft, WF/DS222/R (Feb. 19,
2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002) [hereinafter Canada-Aircraft II].
VOL. 37, NO. 2
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 413
to its regional aircraft industry.,' Article 21.5 compliance proceedings associated with the
first case found that part of the revised measures continued to provide export subsidies, but
the new Panel ruled that certain of Brazil's claims were properly considered outside the
context of the previous dispute because they technically represented new claims of incon-
sistency with the SCM Agreement.
Brazil argued that Canada still provides loan guarantees, financial services, interest rate
support and debt financing despite the Panel's recommendation to remove all subsidies in
the previous case.83 Because the alleged subsidy programs did not mandate the conferral of
a benefit, they were not a prima facie violation of the SCM Agreement. However, the
Canada Account financing on the sale to Air Wisconsin conferred a "benefit" under Article
1.1 (b) of the SCM Agreement as it was offered on terms more favorable than those available
in the market, reconfirming the previous Panel's conclusion that the Canada Account fi-
nancing constituted a prohibited export subsidy under SCM Agreement Article 3.1(1).
The Panel also considered whether the financing fell under the "safe haven" provision
of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies under the SCM Agreement, which refers to the
1979 OECD Arrangement. 4 Because the matching of a derogation by the Canada Account
financing on the Air Wisconsin transaction was not in conformity with the interest rate
provisions of the OECD Arrangement, the Panel concluded that it did not fall within the
scope of the safe haven provision of item (R) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies.
Therefore, the Canada Account financing of the Air Wisconsin transaction was a prohibited
export subsidy. The Panel also found EDC's Corporate Account Financing since 1996 and
IQ Loan Guarantees (provided by the province of Quebec) were prohibited export subsi-
dies. Regarding the IQ equity guarantee, the Panel found no subsidization to exist because
it was neither dejure or defacto contingent upon export performance. However, the Panel
made a different finding for the IQ equity guarantee for which "no fee was charged,"
holding that this constitutes a subsidy.
(ii) United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2002.81 This case,
brought before the Panel by Australia, Brazil, Chile, the European Union, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Korea, Thailand, Canada, and Mexico, addressed the U.S. Continued Dumping and
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000 (Offset Act), also known as the "Byrd Amendment." This law
established that antidumping or countervailing duties would be distributed to the affected
domestic producers to compensate them for qualifying expenditures.- The complaining
parties asserted that there are only three permissible measures available to VATO members
under the AD and SCM Agreements, and that the Offset Act did not fall under any of those
three options. The Panel agreed, finding that the law was contrary to Article 18.1 of the
AD Agreement, Article 32.1 of the SCM Agreement, and Articles VI:2 and VI:3 of the
GAT. The Appellate Body agreed with this finding in a ruling issued in early 2003.7
82. WTO Panel, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 20,
1999), available at http//www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Canada-Aircraft 1].
83. WTO Panel, Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/7 (May 24,
2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
84. If a member is a party to an international undertaking such as the OECD, an export credit practice that is
in conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an export subsidy prohibited by this Agreement. Id.
85. VITO Panel, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy OffietAct of2000, WT/DS217, WT/DS234/
R (Sept. 16, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
86. United States Tariff Act of 1930 § 754(a).
87. VITO Appellate Body, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offiet Act of 2000, V.T/ DS217/
AB/R, WT/DS234/AB/R (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
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The Panel had also found that the Act provided a financial incentive for producers to
initiate and support petitions for antidumping and countervailing duty investigations.
The Panel considered the support for the petition as a prerequisite for receiving offset
payments inconsistent with the principle of good faith protected by AD Agreement Ar-
ticle 5.4 and SCM Agreement Article 11.4. The Appellate Body, however, ultimately
rejected this finding.
The Panel rejected the complainants' argument that AD Agreement Article 8.3 and SCM
Agreement Article 18.3 require the examination of the appropriateness of accepting a price
undertaking and rejecting an undertaking offered for a specific reason. The Panel, agreeing
with the United States, held the Offset Act did not introduce any changes in the U.S.
statutory provisions relating to price undertakings. The Panel also rejected the complaining
parties' argument that the Offset Act violates GAT"T Article X:3(a) because the Act is sub-
stantive in nature and therefore falls outside the scope of GATF Article X:3(a).
3. Other Disputes
a. Chile-Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating To Certain
Agricultural Products"0
This case, brought by Argentina, concerns Chile's price band system (PBS), which al-
lowed for tariff rates to surpass the maximum allowable rate as established in the WTO
Schedule. The PBS established the methodology for the calculation of the upper and lower
thresholds of the price band. The Appellate Body explained that the PBS is at least similar
to two of the prohibited measures listed in Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement, namely
"variable import levies" and "minimum import price." The variable import levies were
similar to the PBS, as both incorporate a scheme or formula that ensures duties will change
automatically and continuously in a manner that lacks transparency and predictability. The
term "minimum import price" was defined by the Appellate Body as "generally the lowest
price at which imports of a certain product may enter a Member's domestic market." The
Appellate Body reconfirmed the Panel's conclusion that, if the weekly reference price in
Chile's PBS is below the lower threshold of the band, the customs authorities will levy the
standard applied duty and add an additional duty. Therefore, instead of merely amending
the PBS to set a maximum threshold of a 31.5 percent duty, to comply with the bound rate
in Chile's WTO schedule, Chile's PBS should have been converted into an ordinary cus-
toms duty as directed by Article 4.2 of the Agriculture Agreement.
b. United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 19981
This dispute concerns Section 211 of the United States Omnibus Appropriations Act of
1998, which effectively prohibits Cuba, Cuban nationals, or other nationals who have an
interest in trademarks or trade names related to certain confiscated goods, from renewing
the trademarks or trade names without the consent of the original owner, as they are not
permitted to pay the requisite fees. The European Union challenged various aspects of the
Act under the TRIPS Agreement. The Panel largely rejected the EU claims, and the Ap-
pellate Body largely agreed based on the view that the Agreement simply did not cover
88. WTO Appellate Body, Chile-Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating To Certain Agricultural
Products, WTO/DS207/AB/R (Sept. 23, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
89. VTO Appellate Body, United States-Section 211 Omnibus Appropriations Act of1998, WT/DS 176/AB/
R (Feb. 1, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
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many of the issues raised by the Act. However, the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel's
finding that the Agreement did not cover trade names (in addition to trademarks). The
Appellate Body also found, contrary to the Panel, that Article 21 1(a)(2) of the Act violated
the principle of national treatment. Finally, the Appellate Body ruled that, because an "origi-
nal owner" who is Cuban is subject to the measures at issue while a non-Cuban original
owner is not, Sections 21 1(a)(2) and 21 1(b) also violate the most favored nation obligations
under the TRIPS Agreement.
B. IMPLEMENTATION
1. Completed implementation
Consultations have proven an effective way to end disputes as at least two disputes were
settled amicably between parties this year, before Panel requests were filed. The United
States and Argentina came to a resolution in Argentina - Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals
and Test Data Protection for Agricultural Chemicals.9" The United States was concerned that
Argentina did not have laws that provided for the adequate protection of pharmaceutical
patents, nor did it have an avenue for ensuring exclusive marketing rights for such products.
Argentina agreed to either submit a bill to its Congress, to comply with TRIPS, or to apply
its current laws in a TRIPS-consistent manner in the following areas: compulsory licenses,
exclusive marketing rights, import restrictions, product by process patent protection, shift-
ing of the burden of proof in process patent infringement cases, preliminary injunctions to
prevent patent infringement, patentability of micro-organisms and other subject matter,
transitional patents, and the protection of test data against unfair commercial use. In another
dispute, Peru-Tax Treatment on Certain Imported Products, the Peruvian government agreed
to withdraw a law that applied an 18 percent tax on imports of fresh fruits, vegetables, fish,
milk, tea, and other natural products.91
Korea and the United States came to a compromise agreement in United States-Defin-
itive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea.9
Both parties extended the deadline until September 1, 2002, for establishing a reasonable
period of time for the United States to comply with the Appellate Body's Report. On July
31, 2002, the parties agreed that if the United States had not terminated the measure by
September 1, 2003, the in-quota volume of imports from Korea would be increased.
Though this measure was referred to as temporary, it effectively became the only relief
from which Korea would benefit, because the safeguard measures were already scheduled
to end on March 1, 2003. 93
90. Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Argentina-Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals and Test Data
Protection for Agricultural Chemicals, WT/DS 171/3 (May 31, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited
Mar. 6, 2002).
91. Communication from Chile, Peru-Tax Treatment on Certain Imported Products, WT/DS2 55/5 (Sept. 25,
2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Jan. 9, 2002).
92. Agreement under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, United States-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe from Korea, WT/DS202/18 (July 31, 2002), available at http://
www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2003).
93. Proclamation 72 74-To Facilitate Positive Adjustment to Competition from Imports of Circular Welded Carbon
Quality Line Pipe, 65 Fed. Reg. 9,193, 9,194 (Feb. 23, 2002).
SUMMER 2003
416 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
2. Pending Implementation
The U.S. Congress continues to drag its heals in implementing the ruling in United
States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916.94 The original deadline to repeal the Act was set as
December 31, 2001. Though two bills have been introduced before the U.S. Congress to
repeal this Act, neither was even brought to a vote before the committees. 95 Key members
of Congress have opposed the necessary legislation, and the Administration has not actively
sought the law's repeal.96 Rather than face the issue, the European Union and Japan have
continued with the suspension of the arbitration proceedings under Article 22.2 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU).97
In another case, the United States made some effort to implement the DSB ruling but
failed to address all of the adverse findings adopted by the DSB. In United States-Anti-
Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from Japan,9 the United States had
until November 23, 2002 to implement the DSB ruling.99 On the day before that deadline,
the United States issued a status report to the DSB explaining that the USDOC had issued
an amended final determination that: (1) uses information supplied by two companies that
was originally rejected as "untimely", (2) removes the adverse facts applied to another re-
spondent with respect to certain unreported U.S. sales and bases the margin entirely on
reported U.S. sales information, (3) applies an even-handed arm's length test to select home
market sales as a basis for normal value, and (4) calculates an "all others" rate that is below
the Anti-Dumping Agreement "ceiling."0 It also implemented its new arm's length test
to be applied in all future cases. 10 The United States did not, however, make the required
statutory change to the all others rate provision and reported that it would consult with
Congress to resolve the remaining issues.
The United States apparently believes that no action is necessary to implement the Ap-
pellate Body's rulings concerning errors in the ITC methodology for finding injury. The
94. Communication from the Arbitrator, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WTIDS136/18 and
WT/DS162/21 (Feb. 27, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
95. See H.R. 3557, 107th Cong. (2001). This bill proposed by Congressman Thomas would have repealed
the 1916 Antidumping Act retroactively. See also H.R. 4902, 107th Cong. (2002). This bill proposed by Con-
gressman Hyde would have only prospectively repealed the 1916 Antidumping Act. This action would be
unacceptable to complainants in this case. See also EU Presses for U.S. WFO Compliance, as Baucus Sees Links to
Commission, INsIDE U.S. TRADE, June 14, 2002, available at http://www.insidetrade.com.
96. Greg Mastel, Chief Trade Counsel for the Senate Finance Committee stated, "If there's a conflict
between our laws and a [trade] agreement, Congress is likely to opt for trade law protection." Senate Aide Sees
Congress refusing to Address Adverse WTO Rulings, INsIDE U.S. TRADE, Sept. 20, 2002, available at
www.insidetrade.com. Aides of Senate Finance Committee Chairman Max Baucus have indicated that if the
Bush Administration attempted to incorporate legislation to appeal the 1916 Antidumping Act, it would "kill
the whole [trade] bill" (i.e., it would jeopardize TPA). Baucts Casts Doubt on Adding TO Fixes to Bill in
Conference, INsIDE U.S. TRADE, June 14, 2002, available at http://www.insidetrade.com.
97. Communication from the Arbitrator, United States-Anti-Dumping Act of 1916, WT/DS136/18 and
WTI/DS162/21 (Feb. 27, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6,2002).
98. WVTO Appellate Body, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel Products from
Japan, WT/DS 184/AB/R (Aug. 23, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002) [herein-
after United States-Hot-Rolled Steel].
99. Award of the Arbitrator, United States-Hot-Rolled Steel, WT/DS184/13 (Feb. 19, 2002), available at
http://www.wto.org (last visited Mar. 6, 2002).
100. Status Report by the United States, United States-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel
Products from Japan, WT/DS I84/15/Add.3 (Feb. 19, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org.
101. Antidumping Proceedings: Affiliated Party Sales in tbe Ordinary Course of Trade, 67 Fed. Reg. 69,186 (Nov.
15, 2002) (modification concerning affiliated party sales in the comparison market).
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Appellate Body stated that the ITC must separate and distinguish the injurious effect of
factors other than imports, commonly known as non-attribution. The United States has
taken the position that the Appellate Body "merely found fault with the Panel's reasoning
and was not reviewing the underlying facts of the case." 102 Whether Japan will challenge
this position is unclear. For the time being, Japan has agreed to allow the United States
until December 31, 2003, to comply with the Appellate Body ruling. 1°3
3. Article 21.5 Challenges
Several parties challenged, under article 21.5, the nature of implementation taken by
countries previously found to violate WTO Agreements. We review some of the more
important article 21.5 rulings below.
a. United States-Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations °4
On March 20, 2000, the DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body reports in this case
and recommended that the United States withdraw the FSC subsidies. After an extension
of time, the United States passed the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion
Act of 2000 (ETI Act) on November 15, 2000. Unsatisfied with these measures, the EC
appealed the implementation under article 21.5 of the DSU. On January 29, 2002, both
the Panel and the Appellate Body reports were adopted, and they agreed with the European
Union that the ETI Act violated the SCM Agreement, the Agreement on Agriculture, and
article III:4 of GATT. The European Union had already requested authorization from the
DSB to suspend concessions in the amount of four billion dollars per year. The United
States objected to this request and requested that this matter be referred to an arbitrator.
Because there was already a compliance Panel established, the parties agreed to suspend
the arbitration proceeding until the adoption of the compliance reports.
The United States argued that the maximum amount of suspended concessions should
total only $1.1 billion, equaling the European Union's share of the total subsidy for 2000
of $4.1 billion. The European Union countered that article 4.10 allows it to seek the full
value of the subsidy to induce compliance by the United States. The arbitrator ruled in
favor of the European Union, finding that there is nothing in the text of the SCM Agree-
ment that limits the award to only the percentage of the total incurred by the EU. For the
countermeasures to act as an inducement for the United States to remedy its non-WTO
consistent law, they would have to equal the benefit incurred by the subsidy. The arbitrator
granted the EC's request of countermeasures totaling four billion dollars per year.
b. Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation
of Dairy Products'os
On October 27, 1999, the DSB adopted the Panel and Appellate Body reports in the
original Canada-Milk/Dairy dispute.'0 6 Both New Zealand and the United States believed
102. U.S. Response Leaves WTO Ruling on Hot-Rolled Injury Claims Untouched, INSIDE U.S. TRADE (Nov. 15,
2002), available at http://www.insidetrade.com.
103. Status Report by the United States, supra note 100.
104. VITO Decision of the Arbitrator, United States-Tax Treatment for Foreign Sales Corporations, VVT/
DS108/ARB (Aug. 30, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org.
105. WTO Appellate Body, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation Of Dairy
Products, WT/DS103/AB/RW2, WT/DS 113/AB/RW2 (Dec. 20, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org.
106. VITO Panel, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products,
WT/DS I 03/R, WTI/DS I 131R (May 17, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org. See also WTO Appellate Body,
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that Canada's implementation measures failed to comply with the DSB's recommendations.
Therefore, the complainants requested that the matter be referred to the original Panel
under DSU article 21.5. The article 21.5 Panel found that by providing export subsidies
through its commercial export milk (CEM) class, as defined in Agriculture Agreement
article 9.1 (c), in excess of its commitment levels Canada violated several provisions of the
Agriculture Agreement. 07 This second issue concerned whether the CEM program in-
volved "payments" and whether such payments were "financed by virtue of governmental
action." The CEM program allowed for pre-commitment contracts, and the milk under
these contracts was not subject to pricing or volume regulations. However, if that milk were
sold on the domestic market, there would be financial penalties appliedoo
On appeal, the Appellate Body, due to a lack of factual findings, was unable to uphold
the Panel's assessment of whether a "payment" existed. Therefore, the Appellate Body could
not determine whether these measures violated the Agriculture Agreement. 1 9 Because of
the Appellate Body's decision, the complainants requested that a second article 21.5 Panel
be established, as they argued that there continued to be a disagreement as to whether
Canada's measures complied with the DSB's ruling. The second compliance Panel found
again that the CEM program was in violation of the Agreement on Agriculture." l0 Upon
review the Appellate Body overturned the burden of proof set by the Panel for Agriculture
Agreement article 10.3.111 The correct burden was for the complainants to demonstrate
that if Canada had exported dairy products in quantities exceeding its commitment levels,
then Canada would have to prove that those exports did not benefit from export subsidies.
Additionally, the Appellate Body upheld the Panel decision that sales under this program
were "payments" because they were below the total average cost of production. Additionally,
these payments were "financed by virtue of governmental action" because the higher in-
quota prices allowed producers to cover their fixed costs and enabled them to make CEM
sales below cost.
IV. U.S. Trade Remedy Decisions
In 2002, countries around the world continued their active use of trade remedy laws.
According to the WTO, 305 new antidumping (AD) cases were initiated between July 1,
2001 and June 30, 2002 and definitive duties were imposed in 184 cases during the same
period." 2 With respect to countervailing duties (CVD), a total of eighteen new cases were
initiated between July 1, 2001 and June 30, 2002, and definitive duties were assessed in
Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, WT/DS103/AB/R,
WT/DSI 13/AB/R (Oct. 13, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org. See also Action by the Dispute Settlement
Body, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Daiy Products, WT/DS 103/11,
WT/DSI 13/11 (Feb. 25, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org.
107. WTO Panel, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products,
WT/DS 103/RW, WT/DS1I3/RW (July 11, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org.
108. Id.
109. WTO Appellate Body, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy
Products, WT/DS I 03/AB/RW, WT/DS 113/AB/RW (Dec. 3, 2001), available at http://www.wto.org.
110. V/TO Panel, Canada-Measures Affecting the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products,
WT/DSI03RW2, WT/DS1 13/RW2 (July 26, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org.
111. WTO Appellate Body, supra note 105.
112. See Report (2002) of the Committee on Antidumping Practices, G/L/581 at Annex C (Oct. 9, 2002),
available at http://www.wto.org.
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seventeen cases during the same period."' The United States led the world with eleven
CVD initiations,"14 and had a total of fifty-eight AD initiations, second-place behind India's
seventy-six, but ahead of the European Union with twenty-three."' The People's Republic
of China continued to be the most frequent target of antidumping actions,"16 and steel
continued to be the industry most often investigated."' In the United States, the steel
safeguard proceeding and the AD/CVD investigations of Softwood Lumber from Canada
dominated trade remedy litigation. Also notable were the USDOC's market economy de-
terminations affecting Russia, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam.
A. ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS
1. Steel Safeguard Proceedings
In 2002, the United States completed the largest and most complex safeguard proceeding
in its history following the ITC's affirmative injury findings for carbon and alloy "flat-
rolled" products (including slab, plate, hot-rolled, cold-rolled, and corrosion-resistant
steels), tin mill products, hot bar, cold bar, rebar, flanges and welded tubular products other
than oil country tubular goods (OCTG), and stainless steel bar and rod.' 8 After a series of
USTR hearings and a period of intense lobbying by all parties, President Bush proclaimed
a steel remedy on March 5, 2002, imposing tariffs of 30 percent on flat products (except
slab), tin mill products, and hot and cold-finished bar."' In all, the remedies imposed by
the President were generally stronger than those recommended by the Commission ma-
jority but less than those recommended by Commissioners Bragg and Devaney. Tariffs of
15 percent were imposed on rebar, certain tubular products, and stainless steel rod,1' while
fittings, flanges, and stainless steel wire received slightly lower tariffs."' A tariff-rate quota
of 5.4 million short tons-less than the seven million recommended by the Commission
majority"'-was imposed on slab with a 30 percent out-of-quota tariff."' President Bush
decided to impose these safeguard measures for a period of three years, rather than the four
years recommended by the ITC. Significantly, the proclamation exempted most developing
countries from its coverage and directed the USDOC and USTR to evaluate all pending
product exclusion requests and to entertain future exclusion requests.
The President's proclamation was widely condemned by the United States' trading part-
ners and sparked an intense political and media debate, with many viewing the President's
113. See Report (2002) of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/L/585, at Annex F
(Nov. 6, 2002), available at http://www.wto.org.
114. Seeid.
115. See Report (2002) of the Committee on Antidumping Practices, supra note 112, at Annex C.
116. See WTO-Antidumping Statistics, Initiations: by exporting country from 1/1/95 tbrough 30/6/02, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop.e/adp-e/adpstartab l_e.htm.
117. See WTO-Antidumping Statistics, Initiations: by sector from 1/1/95 tbrougb 30/6/02, available at http://
www.wto.org/english/ratop-e/adpe/adp.stattab4_e.htm.
118. See International Trade Commission, Steel Determination, Pub. 3479 (Dec. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.usitc.gov.
119. See Press Release, The Executive Office of the President, Fact Sheet: Regarding the PresidentialAction
on Steel (Mar. 5, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Steel Determination, supra note 118, at Annex C.
123. See id.
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decision as a political one calculated to secure Republican votes in the steel producing states
of West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Ohio.24 The European Union's initial response was
to threaten $380 million in trade retaliation against U.S. goods and convene a VVTO dispute
settlement panel.'25 Ultimately, however, the European Union decided to delay its retalia-
tion, concluding, "the EU interest is best served by maintaining maximum pressure on the
U.S. to deliver a meaningful rebalancing package of exclusions." 126 Between March and
August of 2002, the Administration announced a total of 727 product exclusions-including
certain plate, hot-rolled, cold-rolled, corrosion resistant, tin mill, and stainless steel prod-
ucts-the majority of which benefited European Union or Japanese steel producers."27 Al-
though these exclusions prevented immediate retaliatory action by the European Union or
Japan, the steel safeguard measures remain under attack in pending dispute settlement
proceedings, leaving open the possibility of retaliatory action by the European Union,
Japan, and other nations once the Panel and/or Appellate Body rule.
2. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases
a. Negative ITC Steel Determinations
In May 2002, the Commission reached a negative preliminary injury determination for
OCTG from thirteen countries, 2 8 and in the following month, it issued a final negative
injury determination concerning certain structural steel beams from China, Germany, Lux-
embourg, Russia, South Africa, Spain, and Taiwan. 12 9 In August 2002, the ITC determined,
by a vote of 4-1, that the U.S. steel industry was not materially injured or threatened with
material injury by certain cold-rolled carbon steel products from Australia, India, Japan,
Sweden, and Thailand, 130 stating that "[tlhe Section 201 investigation and the President's
remedy fundamentally altered the U.S. market for many steel products, including cold-
rolled steel," and that "Section 201 relief was the overwhelming factor in the sharp decline
in subject imports during the most recent period examined."' Two months later, the Com-
mission issued a final negative determination-based on the same analysis-in its investi-
gation of cold-rolled carbon steel products from the remaining fifteen countries subject to
the investigation.'3 2 These negative cold-rolled determinations represented a setback to the
124. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Testing His Metal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2002, at A21; David E. Sanger, March
3-9: Economy; Man of Steel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2002, at D2; Jennifer L. Rich, U.S. Admits that Politics Was
Behind Steel Tariffi, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at WI.
125. See U.K., Sweden Press Bush Administration to Provide New Exemptions from Steel Tariffi, Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA), at 1412 (Aug. 15. 2002); Geoff Winestock & Neil King Jr., EU Aims at White House in Retaliation to
Steel Tariffs, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A2.
126. U.S. Exempts 37 More Steel Products from Import Tariffi Imposed Last March, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), at
1413 (Aug. 15, 2002).
127. See U.S. Announced Final List of Steel Exclusions for This Year; EU, Japan Main Beneficiaries, Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA), at 1489 (Sept. 5, 2002).
128. See Oil Country Tubular Goods from Austria, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Romania,
South Africa, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and Venezuela, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-428, 731 -TA-992-994 and 996-1005,
USITC Pub. No. 3511 (May 2002) (Preliminary).
129. Certain Structural Steel Beams from China, Germany, Luxembourg, Russia, South Africa, Spain and Taiwan,
Inv. Nos. 73 I-TA-935-936 and 938-942, USITC Pub. No. 3522 (June 2002) (Final).
130. See Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Products from Australia, India, Japan, Sweden, and Thailand, Inv. Nos. 73 1-
TA-965, 971-972, 979, and 981, USITC Pub. 3536 (Sept. 2002) (Final).
131. See id. at 28.
132. See Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Products from Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, China, France, Germany, Korea, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Spain, Taiwan, Turkey, and Venezuela, Inv. Nos. 701 -TA-42 3-25
and 731-TA-964, 966-970, 973-978, 980, and 982-983, USITC Pub. 3551 (Nov. 2002) (Final).
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U.S. steel industry and suggest that, at least for the time being, the Commission majority
is skeptical of injury claims by steel producers receiving Section 201 protection.
b. Softwood Lumber from Canada
In 2002, the USDOC continued its AD and CVD investigations of Softwood Lumberfrom
Canada. Following a final affirmative threat determination from the ITC, 3  the USDOC
imposed a countrywide CVD rate of 18.79 percent'3 4 and an average AD cash deposit rate
of 8.43 percent. 1" As a result, Canadian producers are now subject to annual cash deposits
of roughly $1.5 billion, qualifying this trade dispute as one of the largest in history. Several
aspects of the case are of general interest:
" In the AD case, the USDOC decided to allocate joint production costs according to
the net realizable value (NRV) of the products sold in the U.S. market, that is, based
on period of investigation (POI) home market net sale prices adjusted for freight and
selling expenses. 36 Significantly, the USDOC's value-based cost allocation considered
price differences based on log species and lumber grade, but not dimension (length/
width/thickness). Furthermore, when comparing U.S. sales to similar products in the
home market, Commerce made no difference in merchandise (DIFMER) adjustment
based on differences in dimension because there was no cost difference between these
products under its cost allocation methodology. These two issues-the USDOC's de-
cision not to extend its NRV-based cost allocation through dimension and its decision
not to compute a (non-zero) DIFMER adjustment when comparing similar products
with different dimensions-are at the heart of an appeal now pending before a NAFTA
Chapter 19 Panel."'
" In the CVD case, the USDOC determined that the "stumpage" programs under which
Canadian provinces provide rights to harvest standing timber on provincial forestlands
conferred countervailable subsidies to softwood lumber producers during the period of
investigation. The USDOC held that these programs were countervailable subsidies
because (1) they provided a "financial contribution" of "goods" by a government, spe-
cifically "timber harvesting rights," (2) they provided a "benefit," that is, the goods
were provided at "less than adequate remuneration," and (3) the programs were "spe-
cific" because they were limited to lumber producers, pulp and paper manufacturers,
and re-manufacturers. 1' s Among the myriad issues in dispute was the USDOC's benefit
calculation, that is, its determination that stumpage rights were provided at "less than
adequate remuneration." The U.S. statute provides that "adequacy of remuneration
133. See Softwood Lumber from Canada, USITC Pub. 3509 Inv. Nos. 701-TA-414 and 731 -TA-928 (May
2002) (Final), available at http://www.usitc.gov/wais/reports/arc/w3 509.htm.
134. See Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty
Order: Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,070 (May 22, 2002).
135. See Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Antidumping Duty
Order: Certain Softwood Lumber Products From Canada, 67 Fed. Reg. 36,068 (May 22, 2002) (respondent
AD margins ranged from 2.18% to 12.44%).
136. See Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Softwood
Lumber Products from Canada, at 15-16 (May 22, 2002), available at http://www.ita.doc.gov.
137. See Complaints, Softwood Lumber from Canada, Case No. USA-CDA-2002-1904-02 (May 2, 2002).
138. See generally Issues and Decision Memorandum: Final Results of the Countervailing Duty Investigation
of Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada (Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinafter CVD Issues and Decision
Memorandum], available at http://www.ita.doc.gov.
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shall be determined in relation to prevailing market conditions for the good or service
being provided ... in the country which is subject to investigation or review."139 The
USDOC rejected the use of an in-Canada benchmark-for example, Canadian private
timber market data-because it found that such prices were fundamentally distorted
by the existence of Canadian provincial stumpage programs.'- Accordingly, the
USDOC resorted to a "cross-border" comparison, using adjusted timber prices in the
United States as the benchmark for measuring adequacy of remuneration.1 41 In the
USDOC proceeding, the Canadian parties had argued without success that this cross-
border methodology was unlawful. But a subsequent WTO Panel considering the issue
in the context of the USDOC's preliminary determination ruled that the WTO Sub-
sidies Code requires use of an in-Canada benchmark. 42 The same issue is now being
litigated before a NAIFTA Chapter 19 Panel.
Notwithstanding the U.S. industry's success before the USDOC, the 27 percent border
measure resulting from the May 2002 AD/CVD orders failed to slow imports or raise prices
for U.S. lumber during the second half of 2002. Canadian shipments of lumber into the
U.S. market remained steady and, despite strong housing starts, lumber prices fell by 20
percent. At year's end, both the United States and Canadian parties continued to aggres-
sively litigate the lumber cases in both the NAFTA and WTO fora, each side confidently
expecting to prevail.
c. PET Film from India
In the companion AD/CVD investigations of PET Film from India, the USDOC calcu-
lated a net export subsidy rate of 20.12 percent 4 and a dumping margin of 10.34 percent'"
for respondent Polyplex. In an unprecedented move, the USDOC did not simply reduce
the respondent's AD cash deposit rate to zero to account for its receipt of export subsidies
during the POI, but it went further to exclude Polyplex from the AD order because its
adjusted cash deposit rate-not its dumping margin-was zero. 14 Petitioners have appealed
from the AD order, arguing that, notwithstanding 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C),'14 the
USDOC lacks the statutory authority to exclude a respondent from an AD order when it
calculates a dumping margin above de minimis during the POI.'4
1
3. Market Economy Determinations-Russia, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam
In 2002, the USDOC considered the "market economy" status of Russia, Kazakhstan,
Ukraine, Vietnam, Lithuania, Romania, and Estonia. Significantly, the USDOC decided to
139. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(E).
140. See CVD Issues and Decision Memorandum, supra note 138, at 33-53.
141. See id.
142. See Panel Report, United States-Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumberfrom
Canada, WT/DS236/R, adopted Nov. 1, 2002, available at http://www.wto.org.
143. See Notice of Final Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination: Polyethylene Terephthalate Film,
Sheet, and Strip (PET Film) from India, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,905, 34,906 (May 16, 2002).
144. See Notice of Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value: Polyethylene Terephthalate Film,
Sheet, and Strip (PET Film) from India, 67 Fed. Reg. 34,899, 34,901 (May 16, 2002).
145. See id. n.2.
146. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(c)(1)(C) (requiring Commerce to increase a producer's price by the "amount of
any countervailing duty imposed on the subject merchandise.., to offset an export subsidy") (emphasis added).
147. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment Upon the Agency Record,
Consol. Ct. No. 02-00-463, at 3 (Nov. 5, 2002).
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grant market economy status to Russia (effective April 1, 2002) and Kazakhstan (effective
October 1, 2001) 4 s1 while deciding to treat Vietnam as a non-market economy in the first
case ever brought against that country.149 The USDOC decided to postpone its determi-
nation regarding Ukraine,Iss however, and at year's end, it was still considering the status
of Lithuania, Romania, and Estonia. 5'
The market economy determinations for Russia and Kazakhstan have two important
consequences. First, the USDOC will be required to use respondents' actual prices and
costs to calculate normal value in future antidumping cases rather than relying on surrogate
country price and cost data (which generally disfavor respondents). Second, petitioners will
now be able to bring cases against Russia and Kazakhstan under the U.S. countervailing
duty law. Because neither Russia nor Kazakhstan is "Subsidies Agreement Countries" at
the present time, CVD cases may be brought against them without the need for an injury
determination by the ITC.1"
4. Sunset Reviews
The USDOC and the ITC faced a comparatively light schedule of five-year sunset reviews
in 2002.'1 Of the ten five-year sunset reviews initiated by the USDOC in 2 002,114 five resulted
in proforma revocations due to a lack of interest by the domestic industry, 1 one was mooted
because there was no longer a suspended investigation for which to perform a review,116
148. See Memorandum From Albert Hsu, Barbara Mayer and Christopher Smith throughJeff May to Faryar
Shirzad: Inquiry into the Status of the Russian Federation as a Non-Market Economy Country Under the U.S.
Antidumping Law (June 6, 2002), available at http://www.ita.doc.gov; Memorandum from George Smolik to
Faryar Shirzad: Antidumping Duty Investigation of Silicomanganese from Kazakhstan-Request for Market
Economy Status (Mar. 25, 2002), available at http://www.ita.doc.gov.
149. See Memorandum from Shauna Lee-Alaia, George Smolik, Athanasios Mikhalakas, and Lawrence Nor-
ton Through Jeff May to Faryar Shirzad: Antidumping Duty Investigation of Certain Frozen Fish Filets from
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; Determination of Market Economy Status (Nov. 8, 2002), available at
http://www.ita.doc.gov.
150. See Notice to Defer a Decision Regarding Ukraine's Non-Market Economy Status, 67 Fed. Reg. 5 1,536
(Aug. 8, 2002).
151. Notice of Initiation of Inquiry into the Status of Lithuania as a Non-Market Economy Country for
Purposes of the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws under a Changed Circumstances Review of the
Solid Urea Order Against Lithuania, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,393 (Sept. 10, 2002); Certain Small Diameter Carbon
and Alloy Seamless Standard, Line and Pressure Pipe From Romania: Preliminary Results of Antidumping
Duty Administrative Review and Postponement of Final Results, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,388, 57,390 (Sept. 10, 2002);
Notice of Initiation of a Changed Circumstances Review of the Antidumping Duty Order on Solid Urea from
Estonia, 67 Fed. Reg. 63,886 (Oct. 16, 2002).
152. See 19 U.S.C. § 1671(c)(1).
153. See Import Administration, List of Sunset Review Revocations and Continuations, available at http://
www.ia.ita.doc.gov/sunset.
154. Several of these reviews covered multiple countries.
155. See Collated Roofing Nails from China and Taiwan, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,578 (Nov. 25, 2002) (revocation
of AD orders); Engineered Process Gas Turbo-Compressor Systems from Japan, 67 Fed. Reg. 40,270 (June
12, 2002) (revocation of AD order); Large Newspaper Printing Presses and Components Thereof, Whether
Assembled or Unassembled, from Japan and Germany.67 Fed. Reg. 8522 (Feb. 25, 2002) (revocation of AD
orders); Melamine Institutional Dinnerware from Indonesia, China, and Taiwan, 67 Fed. Reg. 7355 (Feb. 19,
2002) (revocation of AD orders); Sodium Azide from Japan, 67 Fed. Reg. 1438 (Jan. 11, 2002) (revocation of
AD order).
156. See Fresh Tomatoes from Mexico, 67 Fed. Reg. 50,858, 50,859 (Aug. 6, 2002) (termination of sunset
review of suspended antidumping investigation).
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two were continued,' and two were still pending before the ITC following affirmative
findings by USDOC.15 8
B. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE (CIT) AND FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS
1. FAG Italia-Duty Absorption Inquiries for Transition Orders
In FAG Italia,5 9 the Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT's finding that the USDOC lacked
the statutory authority to conduct a duty absorption inquiry pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1675(a)(4) for "transition orders," that is, antidumping orders predating the implemen-
tation of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA) on January 1, 1995. The USDOC
had maintained that, because the statute authorized such inquiries during reviews initiated
two and four years after a post-URAA antidumping order' 6° and because transition orders
were deemed to be issued on January 1, 1995 for sunset review purposes,161 it had the
authority to conduct such an absorption inquiry in a review taking place in the second year
afterJanuary 1, 1995. The court scolded the USDOC for "seriously misunderstand[ing] its
role under Chevron,"162 noting that "statutory silence as to Commerce's power to initiate
duty absorption inquiries for transition orders does not give Commerce authority to con-
duct such inquiries."
63
2. Nippon Steel III-Devaney Recess Appointment
This case represented the final CIT ruling concerning the circumstances under which
Commissioner Devaney was appointed to the ITC. Following discovery proceedings to
collect information on the timing of Commissioner Devaney's recess appointment, the CIT
ruled on plaintiffs' challenge to the validity of the ITC's 3-3 sunset review vote in the
Grain-Oriented Silicon Electrical Steel (GOES) case. 164 Plaintiffs had argued, inter alia, that
Devaney's participation in the ITC vote was constitutionally infirm because (1) the Presi-
dent did not sign the commission appointing Devaney until after the Senate had returned
from its recess, and (2) there was not a "vacancy" to which Devaney could be appointed.
The court, however, concluded that Devaney's appointment was a valid recess appointment
and that there was indeed a vacancy since Commissioner Askey's term had already expired.
According to the court, the President's personal approval of the appointment and his prep-
aration of the recess appointment order constituted the "open and unequivocal act" nec-
essary for an appointment. In other words, the formal commission (which occurred after
the Senate returned from its recess) was not necessary to complete a recess appointment.
157. See Persulfates from China, 67 Fed. Reg. 66,001 (Oct. 29, 2002) (ITC determination); Final Results of
Expedited Sunset Review: Persulfates from China, 67 Fed. Reg. 62,226 (Oct. 4,2002) (ITA decision to continue
AD order); Continuation of Antidumping Duty Order: Brake Rotors from China, 67 Fed. Reg. 52,933 (Aug.
14, 2002).
158. See Crawfish Tail Meat from China, 67 Fed. Reg. 69,557 (Nov. 18, 2002); Steel Concrete Reinforcing
Bar from Turkey, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,628 (Sept. 11, 2002).
159. FAG Italia S.P.A. v. United States, 291 F.3d 806 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
160. See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(4).
161. See id. § 1675(c)(6)(D).
162. FAG Italia, 291 F.3d at 815.
163. Id. at 817.
164. See Nippon Steel Corp. v. United States, 24 I.T.R.D. 1931, 2002 WL 2005835 (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug.
30, 2002) [hereinafter Nippon Ill].
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The court also found that there was a vacancy to which Commissioner Devaney could be
appointed because the holdover statute provided for the termination of Commissioner As-
key's service when a new commissioner takes office. Thus, when the President appointed
Commissioner Devaney during a Senate recess, he created a vacancy that was simulta-
neously filled through the completion of the recess appointment process. 65
3. GTS Industries, lva Lamiere, and Acciali I & II-"Same Person" Test
In a series of cases in 2002, the CIT evaluated the USDOC's methodology for deter-
mining whether non-recurring subsidies continue to be countervailable after a subsidized
business entity is privatized. Specifically, the courts considered the USDOC's two-step test
developed after the Federal Circuit's decision in Delverde III.'" Under the test, the USDOC
first examines whether the post-privatization entity is the "same person" that received the
original subsidies before privatization. 67 If so, then the subsidies are deemed to pass-
through and are countervailable.'61 If not, then the second step of the test looks at the facts
and circumstances of the sale to determine whether the post-sale firm received a financial
contribution and benefit.69 Although the Acciali II court affirmed the USDOC's ap-
proach, 170 the GTS Industries, Ilva Lamiere, and Acciali I courts held that the USDOC's
"same person" test was inconsistent with the legal requirements of Delverde III. Specifically,
the courts found that, under Delverde III, the USDOC was required to "examin[e] the
particular facts and circumstances of the sale and determin[e] whether [the purchaser] di-
rectly or indirectly received both a financial contribution and benefit from the govern-
ment," 7' and that the per se rule embodied in the USDOC's step-one "same person" test
failed to meet that standard.' This analysis was also reflected in the WTO Appellate Body
decision in United States-Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the Eu-
ropean Communities issued in December 2002.
4. SKF-Calculation of CV Profit
In 2001, the Federal Circuit had vacated a CIT ruling that the USDOC's longstanding
CV Profit methodology was consistent with U.S. law.'73 Specifically, it directed the CIT to
remand the case for "a reasonable explanation of why the USDOC uses different definitions
of 'foreign like product' for price purposes and ... constructed value." 74 In March 2002,
the USDOC released its re-determination in the SKE case, explaining that continuation of
its pre-URAA CV Profit methodology comports with the post-URAA statute and that,
contrary to SKF's contention, the statute does not require it to locate "identical" or "like"
165. The court's analysis of this issue was also incorporated by reference into the Corts decision. See Corus
Group PLC v. Bush, 2002 WL 31008986 (Ct. Int'l Trade Sept. 5, 2002) (holding that Commissioner Devaney's
vote was valid).
166. See Delverde SRL v. United States, 202 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Delverde I11].
167. See, e.g., Ilva Lamiere Tubi S.R.L. v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1350 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002).
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. See Acciali Speciali Teri S.P.A. v. United States, 206 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1355 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002).
171. Delverde 111, 202 F.3d at 1364.
172. See Ilva Lamiere, 196 F. Supp. 2d at 1347; GTS Indus., 2002 WL 31116635; Acciali, 2002 WL 342659.
173. See SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 263 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
174. See SKF USA Inc. v. United States, Slip Ops. 01-130 (Ct. Int'l Trade Nov. 15, 2001) (remand to
Commerce).
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merchandise before using aggregated data for the CV Profit calculation. Specifically, the
USDOC explained that
[w]here the Department must use CV to represent normal value, the Department has either
found no sales of identical or similar products for price comparisons or found such sales to be
outside the ordinary course of trade . . . To now rely solely upon those disregarded sales to
determine profit and SG&A components of CV would be equivalent to constructing the same
value as reflected in the price of those disregarded sales. Adopting such a methodology would
defeat the purpose of the contemporaneity requirement contained in the statute.'"
Without any analysis, the CIT affirmed the USDOC's re-determination."16 At year's end,
SKF's appeal on the CV Profit issue was again pending before the Federal Circuit.
5. Usinor and Nippon Steel II-Quality of ITC Determinations
The CIT issued two opinions taking the ITC to task for failing to adequately explain its
analysis and findings. In Usinor, the court criticized "the Commission's total failure to
analyze or rebut evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs""7 and stated that
[t]o withstand judicial scrutiny, the Commission must sufficiently articulate the basis of its
conclusions.... The Commission must discuss the key issues in its determination and is not
free to simply leave the parties or the court to guess whether these issues were properly factored
into the Commission's analysis .... Its failure to do so here has resulted in a Review Deter-
mination that is unsupported by substantial evidence." Ts
Similarly, in Nippon 11,1'9 the court issued a harsh reprimand of the Commission, noting
that the Commission "failed to follow the court's instructions" on a variety of issues. Some
of the court's strongest criticisms came with respect to the Commission's failure to identify
some of the conditions of competition in the industry, particularly with respect to purchaser
perceptions and expectations, which, in the court's view, should have influenced the Com-
mission's determination with respect to price issues. The court reiterated the Nippon Steel
I court's criticism of the Commission's opinion, emphasizing, "simply noting the impor-
tance of other factors does not constitute analysis sufficient to support its conclusion.,I SO
And rather than remanding the case for the second time, the court ordered the Commission
to enter a negative determination because, in its view, "[riemand[ing] for reconsideration
or recalculation is not necessary in this case, as not only are the Commission's conclusions
unsupported by substantial evidence, it has also demonstrated an unwillingness or inability
to address substantial claims made by respondents or the concerns expressed by the court
in Nippon I."'"
V. Legislative Activity
The year 2002 was notable for Congressional action on trade legislation. In particular,
Congress approved an omnibus trade package with renewal of presidential trade promotion
175. See Final Remand Redetermination, SKF USA v. United States, Ct. No. 98-07-02540, at 21-22 (Mar.
29, 2002).
176. See SKF USA Inc. v. United States, Slip Op. Nos. 02-63, 98-07-02540, 2002 WL 1498051 (Ct. Int'l
Trade July 12, 2002).
177. Usinor v. United States, 2002 WL 1998315 at *5 (Ct. Int'l Trade July 19, 2002).
178. Id. at *23.
179. Nippon Steel Corp., NKK v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1351 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002).
180. Id. at 1361.
181. Id. at 1371-72.
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authority (TPA) as its cornerstone, thus ending eight years of partisan stalemate on the
issue. The omnibus package also included much delayed efforts to revamp the Trade
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, to renew and enhance the Andean Trade Prefer-
ences Act (ATPA), to renew the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program, to
reauthorize the Customs Service, and to establish a $50 million fund for WTO dispute
settlements.
In the face of these new trade liberalization initiatives and of new national security threats
as a result of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. Congress also acted in 2002
to bolster U.S. borders, with the enactment in the fall of the Homeland Security Act and
Maritime Transportation Security Act. It failed, however, to reach agreement on the direc-
tion of U.S. export controls via reauthorization of the Export Administration Act (EAA),
an issue that will pit industry against national security advocates in a similarly difficult battle
in the 108th Congress.
A. TRADE ACT OF 2002
On August 6, President Bush signed the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210, formerly H.R.
3009). The legislation was approved handily in the Senate by a vote of 64 to 34, but it
cleared the House by a very close three-vote margin of 215 to 212.112 Only a score of House
Democrats supported the measure, making the Trade Act vote one of the most contentious
in the House.
1. Trade Promotion Authority
The Trade Act of 2002 extends until 2007 presidential trade promotion authority, for-
merly known as fast-track procedures. TPA allows the President to enter into bilateral,
regional, and multilateral negotiations with trading partners and to bring the agreements
to the U.S. Congress for quick approval without concern that" they will ultimately be
amended. The new negotiating authority is subject to strict congressional consultation and
reporting requirements, and the Act establishes a new Congressional Oversight Group to
serve as official Congressional advisors for any U.S. trade negotiations.
As in previous fast-track bills, the Congress included extensive principal negotiating ob-
jectives as part of the new TPA authority. They cover the following broad range of nego-
tiating topics: (1) trade barriers and distortions, (2) services, (3) foreign investment,
(4) intellectual property, (5) transparency (6) anti-corruption, (7) improvement of 'A/TO
and multilateral trade agreements, (8) regulatory practices, (9) electronic commerce,
(10) agriculture, (11) labor and the environment, (12) dispute settlement and enforcement,
(13) VeTO extended negotiations regarding trade in civil aircraft and rules of origin,
(14) trade remedy laws, (15) border taxes, (16) textile negotiations, and (17) the worst forms
of child labor.8 3
2. Trade Adjustment Assistance
To ensure the necessary amount of Democratic support for the Trade Act of 2002, the
Republican Leadership agreed to include language that revamps and enhances the current
Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program through September 30, 2007. The new TAA
182. Cong. Rec. S7815 (Aug. 1, 2002); Cong. Rec. H5960 (July 26, 2002).
183. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
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will combine the NAFTA TAA program and the previous TAA program into one worker
dislocation program that includes farmers and ranchers. It also will provide assistance to
new categories of dislocated workers, including secondary workers that supply component
parts directly to an affected firm, downstream workers affected by trade with Mexico or
Canada, and certain workers who were fired because their company relocated to a country
with which the United States has an FTA or preferential trading arrangement.
A controversial component of the new TAA legislation is a two-year wage insurance pilot
program aimed at older workers who have been dislocated because of trade. The program
provides workers fifty years of age and older up to 50 percent of the difference between
their new salary and the salary earned at the time of termination of employment. Wage
insurance for eligible workers would be capped at $5,000 for each year of the two-year
period. The law also establishes a new refundable tax credit to cover up to 65 percent of a
TAA recipient's health insurance if he or she is enrolled in a qualified health program.
Qualified programs include but are not limited to: COBRA continuation, certain state based
coverage, and other coverage not associated with a group health plan. I84
3. Generalized System of Preferences
The Trade Act of 2002 includes a retroactive extension of the current Generalized
System of Preferences program through December 31, 2006. The GSP law was first
established on January 1, 1976, pursuant to Title V of the Trade Act of 1974. The program
provides duty-free treatment to over 4,650 products from some 140 beneficiary devel-
oping countries. s85
The Trade Act leaves the previous GSP program virtually intact but enhances the defi-
nition of internationally recognized worker rights as part of the eligibility criteria for ben-
eficiary nations. Under the new language, the President must take into account, as a "factor
of ineligibility," whether a country has not taken steps to "afford international worker
rights" to its workers, including a prohibition of the worst forms of child labor.
4. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
The Trade Act of 2002 includes the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act
(ATPDEA), which enhances the original ATPA statute and retroactively renews it through
December 31, 2006. Duty-free access to imports originating in Andean countries is now
accorded watches and watch parts, petroleum products, certain tuna in flexible containers,
handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and most footwear. A few footwear products
were excluded from benefits, as a result of a determination by the President that they were
"import-sensitive in the context of overall imports from [ATPDEA] beneficiary countries."
The ATPDEA also authorizes certain Andean apparel made from U.S. inputs to enter the
United States duty free without limitation and allows certain Andean apparel made with
regional inputs to enter the U.S. duty-free subject to an annual cap.
However, as part of the ATPDEA, the beneficiary nations will be subject to a new annual
review of compliance with extensive eligibility criteria, including (1) protection of intellec-
tual property consistent with or greater than the TRIPS Agreement; (2) provision of in-
184. See Finance Committee Joint Explanatory Statement of the Trade Act of 2002 Conference Agreement,
July 26, 2002, available at http://finance.senate.gov/leg/hr3009texplstate.pdf.
185. See U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES GUIDEBOOK, issued by the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, March 1999.
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ternationally recognized labor rights; (3) meeting U.S. counter-narcotics certification cri-
teria; (4) steps taken to become a party and implement the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption; (5) conformity with the WTO Agreement on Government Procure-
ment; and (6) support for U.S. antiterrorism efforts.16
5. Customs Reauthorization
Title III of the Trade Act of 2002 reauthorizes and provides additional funding to the
U.S. Customs Service. It also authorizes additional funding to the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative and the U.S. International Trade Commission, as well as counter-terrorism
activities deemed essential in the post-September 11 th security atmosphere. Among the
anti-terrorism provisions, the law mandates advanced electronic cargo manifest informa-
tion, such as point of origin, consignor and consignee, and provides legal immunity from
civil litigation for Customs officials acting in good faith when they conduct searches on
suspicious persons. The law also increases monitoring of illegal textile transshipment ac-
tivities, requiring a General Accounting Office (GAO) audit of Customs' textile transship-
ment initiatives and authorizing funds for textile transshipment enforcement.187
6. Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act and the African Growth and Opportunity Act
The Trade Act of 2002 also enhances trade benefits under the existing Caribbean Basin
Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) and the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
Perhaps most important, the law significantly expands the annual tariff rate quota (or caps)
for duty-free treatment of certain apparel made with regional inputs. For example, whereas
the original cap for knit apparel made in the Caribbean beneficiary countries from regional
fabric and U.S. yams rose gradually to a level not to exceed 250 million square meter
equivalents (SME), the new law raises the cap to 970 million SMEs beginning October 1,
2004, through the duration of the Act.
B. FARM BILL
President Bush signed into law on May 13, 2002, the Farm Security and Rural Investment
Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-171). The law authorizes unprecedented high levels of do-
mestic commodity supports and contains language that encourages the U.S. Secretary of
Agriculture to use more vigorously the Export Enhancement Program; an export subsidy
intended to counteract subsidies and other supports given U.S. competitors overseas. For
the former, however, the law contains a provision that requires the Secretary of Agriculture
to maintain the farm supports within the bounds of U.S. VVTO commitments, acting as a
so-called "circuit breaker" for unauthorized payments. U.S. trading partners have criticized
both provisions in the Farm Act as obstacles to achieving meaningful agricultural reforms
as part of the Doha Development Agenda and FTAA trade negotiations.' 8
C. PORT SECURITY
After months of debate, the Congress finally completed work on the Maritime Trans-
portation Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L No. 107-295) during the lame duck session, which
186. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, 116 Stat. 933 (2002).
187. Id.
188. See generally INSIDE U.S. TRADE, May 10, 2002.
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followed the mid-term congressional elections. The Act is heavily focused on anti-terrorism
activities at the nation's ports of entry, deemed to be especially vulnerable to terrorist attack.
For instance, the law "directs the Secretary of Transportation to assess port vulnerability,
including each facility in a port, wherever the Secretary believes there is a high risk of a
catastrophic emergency."'8 9 The law also mandates the development and maintenance of
"anti-terrorism cargo identification and screening system, including performance standards
for seals and locks of shipping containers." 90
D. HOMELAND SECURITY
President Bush signed into law on November 25, 2002, legislation establishing a De-
partment of Homeland Security (DHS). 9 The DHS consolidates federal agencies with
domestic security functions into one agency. The new DHS will have an impact on the
trade community because the Customs Service will be subsumed within the new depart-
ment. Customs officials have assured anxious business community representatives that the
move will not diminish the facilitation of trade; rather, they say, it will enable the service
to enhance national security while facilitating the flow of goods.
The DHS will have primary responsibility for four broad security categories: border
transportation and security; emergency preparedness and response; chemical, biological,
radiological and nuclear countermeasures; and information analysis and infrastructure
protection.'92
E. EXPORT-IMPORT BANK REAUTHORIZATION
Legislation reauthorizing the Export-Import Bank (Pub. L. No. 107-189), renewing its
operating charter, was signed into law on June 14, 2002. The law extends the Bank's au-
thority through fiscal year 2006.191 Section VIII of the law "directs the Bank to implement:
(1) certain technology improvements designed to improve small business outreach and
(2) an electronic system designed to trade all pending Bank transactions."' 9 The law also
requires annual reports to Congress on its progress in implementing the technological
requirements as well as on annual competitiveness and descriptions of Bank outreach ac-
tivities to socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses.Y95
F. EXTRATERRITORIAL INCOME TAX
The WTO ruled in 2001 that the U.S. extraterritorial income (ETI) tax regime-the
successor to the Foreign Sales Corporation (FSC) tax regime-is illegal under international
trading rules and the United States must comply with the ruling or face up to $4 billion in
189. See Bill Summary and Status of S. 1214, available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
190. Id.
191. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002).
192. Helen Dewar, Senate passes bomeland security bill: Busb calls step 'historic and bold,' WASH. POST, Nov. 20,
2002, at AO1.
193. See Export-Import Bank Reauthorization Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-189 (2002) (bill summary and
status), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
194. Id.
195. Id.
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EU retaliatory tariffs. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Thomas released in
the summer of 2002 a bill (H.R. 5095) that would repeal the ETI law and increase taxes
on direct exporters and on subsidiaries of foreign companies invested in the United States,
while allowing companies to defer paying taxes on foreign-source income, among other
things.
The proposal drew considerable opposition from U.S. exporters, particularly Boeing and
Caterpillar, who complain that the Thomas "fix" rewards companies who have moved
operations overseas. Speaker Hastert, representing Boeing and Caterpillar interests in Il-
linois, opposed the Thomas text. As a result, the legislation failed in the 107th Congress.
Thomas, with Administration backing, intends to reintroduce a perhaps slightly modified
ETI repeal proposal early in the 108th Congress.
G. EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT REAUTHORIZATION
Once TPA was enacted, the Administration expressed a desire to push for reauthorization
of the Export Administration Act, a regime governing control of U.S. exports that lapsed
in 1994. The Administration favored the Senate version of the bill (S. 149), which increased
penalties for violations of export controls but allowed for mass-market availability excep-
tions. This version contrasted with a House bill marked up after the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks that contained stringent national security-oriented amendments and an
increased role for the Department of Defense in the export control process.
Administration tactics to move a more industry-favorable EAA reauthorization bill alien-
ated some key members of the House and U.S. industry who would have been instrumental
in the bill's passage. As a result, efforts to reach a compromise were stalled, leaving this
issue for the 108th Congress.
H. RussIA PERMANENT NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS
Although negotiations to bring Russia into the WTO hit some stumbling blocks, it has
been a goal of the Administration to try to advance permanent normal trade relations
(PNTR) for Russia ahead of its WTO accession as a reward for its cooperation in the war
on terrorism. House Ways and Means Committee Chairman William Thomas and Senator
Richard Lugar (R-IN) led congressional efforts to promote the Administration's objectives
in 2002 by authoring Russia PNTR bills (H.R. 3553 and S. 1861 respectively). Russia
PNTR was blocked, however, by opponents such as Finance Chairman Max Baucus
(D-MT) and Ways and Means Trade Subcommittee Ranking Member Sander Levin
(D-MI), who were concerned about losing leverage on issues of key importance to the
United States, such as the terms of Russia's ,ITO accession and commitments on steel.
Many U.S. industries concurred. In addition, the success of Russia PNTR may hinge on
obtaining more commitments from Russia with respect to protections for religious and
ethnic minorities.
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